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Abstract
Policy choices in the wake of recent mass protests in Egypt will determine the likelihood
of civil war in the short run and the prospects for democracy in the long run. Economic
conditions can be improved by international action to reduce grain-based biofuel production and
finance employment generation. Creating the conditions for stable democracy requires accepting
power-sharing mechanisms in which the military will have an important role to ensure stability.
† Prepared for presentation to the Chairman’s Action Group, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon on Wednesday, July 3, 2013.
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Turmoil in Egypt has returned two and a half years after the fall of Mubarak in 2011.
Risks of an outright civil war are high. The military has deposed the elected president
Mohammed Morsi in response to the largest street protests in Egyptian history, which
involved millions of people. Unrest has not been halted. These events are consistent with
expectations from our published research.
Recent NECSI work shows that revolutions are more likely to result in autocracy than
in stable democracy—even when democracy is the explicit goal of those seeking change
[1]. Revolutions do not allow adequate time for stable democratic institutions to arise; the
pressing economic and social demands on the government are high and unrealistic. Spiraling
discontent poses a continuing and worsening risk of anarchy unless an autocratic system
re-establishes order. At the same time, the creation of a viable democratic system requires
sufficient stability to develop democratic institutions that can successfully achieve legitimacy
in the eyes of the public by mediating between competing interests and meeting economic
needs.
On the surface, it seems that the Egyptian military’s removal of Morsi has undermined
democracy. However, political stability is essential to the creation of a successful democratic
regime. In the post-revolutionary context, there is no real trade-off between democracy and
peace, because stability is necessary for democracy to emerge.
If there had been no military action to remove Morsi, the pattern of recent protests
suggests that millions of people would have stayed in the streets, and the state would have
been unable to impose adequate order. Police forces abandoned the effort to impose order.
The military is the only entity with the capacity to avert violence on a substantial scale.
Thus, Egypt will have the best chances of positive outcomes for both preventing civil
war and increasing the prospects of stable democracy if the military’s intervention can
preserve order and create a stable transition process to a new government. Whether the
current military-led transition will establish sufficient political stability remains to be seen.
Moreover, action must be taken to address the underlying economic problems.
NECSI work shows that among the key drivers of unrest are high food prices that foster
desperation [2–8]. The current global measure of food prices reported by the UN Food and
Agricultural Organization (FAO) is at 215, double its value ten years ago, and just above
the threshold at which NECSI research shows widespread violence takes place [2]. Food
prices are largely set on international markets, where Egyptian government policies have no
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influence, and the burden of high prices must be borne either by the government—in the
form of expanded food subsidies—or by the Egyptian public.
Egypt’s economic weaknesses extend beyond food prices. There is absence of opportunity
and employment for many, especially youth. Economic growth has stagnated since the
revolution in 2011 due to social disruption and consequent loss of economic activity including
tourism and foreign investment [9, 10]. Failures of government services have occurred as a
result of a fiscal crisis and the evaporation of foreign exchange reserves.
Solving these diverse and interrelated economic problems requires a multi-pronged ap-
proach. First, the US must take policy action to reduce corn-to-ethanol conversion, leading
to lower global food prices and dramatically reducing the immediate pressure on poor popu-
lations. A bill to eliminate the mandate for ethanol production is pending in Congress [11],
but further action may be required to actually reduce ethanol production.
Given the current deepening financial and economic crisis in Egypt, political stability also
depends on securing financing for the government budget and reducing unemployment. In
light of its fragile political climate, Egypt can only accomplish these goals with a major aid
package that can overcome the immediate fiscal crisis and reduce the economic desperation.
Negotiations with the International Monetary Fund have carried on for two years without
conclusion of a $4.8 billion loan deal because the Fund insists on austerity measures that
could not be made without prompting violence and chaos. In particular, it is not feasible
for Egypt to reduce food subsidies while high food prices and unemployment prevail. Saudi
Arabia, Qatar, and Libya have been the main financial backers of the Egyptian government
since the 2011 revolution. These governments understand that collapse of the Egyptian
economy would be a cataclysm for the region.
As a more comprehensive economic solution, we have advocated a major public works
program, which regional oil-rich countries can support financially, and to which outside
groups such as the United States Army Corps of Engineers can contribute technical assis-
tance [12]. Such a program is an appropriate response to the current conditions and the
threat of widespread social disorder that would result from inaction.
As an immediate, practical measure, the United States should maintain the flow of eco-
nomic assistance to Egypt. US law requires the suspension of aid to any country in which a
coup d’e´tat deposes an elected government. However, it is better to consider the social un-
rest and military intervention as part of the process of the government transition that began
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with the fall of Hosni Mubarak. Maintaining the flow of aid will not repair the economic
situation in Egypt, but it will help avoid further deterioration.
In addition to economic relief and recovery, Egypt needs stable political structures. The
major political failure of the prior government was its unwillingness to protect the interests
of electoral minorities, making recurring conflict likely. Democracy depends on the existence
of a government acceptable to a broader segment of the population than a simple majority.
It must not be rejected by any minority large enough to cause social disorder. Ideologies and
demands that are wholly excluded from governance undermine stability. When the populace
has opinions that are narrowly distributed around a well-defined mean, democratic gover-
nance is readily achieved. When there are broad distributions of opinion relative to accepted
levels of tolerance, or well separated groups, the ability to achieve legitimacy for governance
is undermined. Decreasing tolerance and increasing divergence of groups undermines the
ability of conventional democratic governance.
Democracy as many American commentators understand it is incompatible with the
Egypt of today. Islamists and secular Egyptians have markedly different aims for the coun-
try’s future. At the time of the 2011 revolution, the Muslim Brotherhood portrayed itself as
occupying this middle ground, but subsequent events have belied this public image. Con-
sequently, neither Islamists nor moderates will acknowledge the legitimacy of governance
by the other. A stable Egyptian political system must therefore be structured, formally or
informally, to ensure that each group with the power to undermine social order has a strong
motivation to preserve it. The Lebanese “troika” arrangement – which requires a Maronite
president, Shi’ite speaker of parliament, and Sunni prime minister – offers a useful example
of a potential power-sharing system. In Egypt, the relevant groups are the Islamists, the
moderates (represented by the National Salvation Front), and the military. It is likely to
be helpful to incorporate the military in government as balancing three groups can be more
stable than two groups, though any balance requires a willingness to compromise. As in any
democracy the possibility of sub-factions being accommodated through compromise must
be present.
Important goals for international engagement in Egypt in light of the recent mass protests
and ouster of the Morsi government are, first, to avoid a major civil war in the short run
and, second, promote a stable government over the longer term. If economic and political
challenges are not overcome, there is a very strong possibility of protracted, large-scale
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violence like that now seen in Syria. Unlike Syria, Egypt is not divided into geographically
distinct enclaves, with the implication that violence could be even more destructive and
widespread in Egypt.
We thank Karla Z. Bertrand, Maya Bialik and Roozbeh Daneshvar for helpful comments.
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